You are not logged in.
What is this? Some sort of trolling?
May be it is an intergalactic humor?
Does not Linux kernel contain some obfuscated code except firmware BLOBs?
Is obfuscated code still present in Devuan kernel?
I think that modern hardware with a loadable firmware actually has a flash rom to keep the latest version of code for backdoors and trojans they ever seen from a user loaded.
A firmware can consist of several parts (at least two):
1) a public blob with code for the device to work well, it loads to device volatile RAM
2) a secret blob (as a part of puplic blob) with code for backdoors and trojans, it loads to device flash rom (persistent non-volatile)
So even if another time you run device with an older loadable firmware provided it still runs with the latest backdoors it remembered from another newer loaded earlier firmware.
For example if CPU reports it has an old level of microcode it does not mean it never seen and learned in its flash rom a newer modern trojan BLOB.
This makes people position promoting the latest BLOBs in loaded firmwares (as you have factory firmware anyway) less strong IMHO.
Thank you very much for returning us the good old Debian as it was in its versions till 5 (Lenny) before it was gradually occupied by systemD corps. I do not treat debian.org true Debian anymore, real free Debian is here at devuan.org now.
Why not to add a Libre (deblobed) kernel directly to Devuan distro? It would make Devuan even more free than it already is and may be even more free than Debian 5 Lenny was.
The same as:
deb mirror://linux-libre.fsfla.org/pub/linux-libre/freesh/mirrors.txt
I run this kernel with Ascii and it is awesome!
After this is done it would be easier for distros without non-free components like EterTICs and Dyne:bolic to maintain them.
Trinity desktop environment would be welcome very much too.
Actually I miss these two things in your repository: Libre kernel & Trinity DE. Like it could be in Exe & EterTICs simultaneously.
The firmware included in the source tree for OpenBSD is CPU microcode, which is needed to prevent instabilities in the hardware so I don't think removing it would help.
I have an Intel Q9500 which is very stable without microcode updates in a Libre kernel,
though just after plugged it into the socket I experienced many undesirable reboots in 10-100 seconds since powering on my computer each time.
The magic happened after booting into SystemRescueCD which made the whole system super stable even after many further power cycles. I think something was flashed during booting into BLOBed SystemRescueCD, but I don't know what exactly, may be simply a boot sector was modified unnoticed, but I am not sure how it is related with a CPU replacement.
I would be more worried about hard drive controllers and other components that don't upload firmware from the OS.
Cannot disk drive firmwares be isolated by whole encryption of everything (kernel and system root FS and data of course too) when booting from Libreboot+GRUB both flashed into the motherboard and then special chipset register set to disable further flashes during this power cycle? I would prefer to cut a flash chip pin to prohibit its reflashing, but I was told it is not like them work.
What do you think about security of Talos II hardware platform?
Yes, I am a big fan of Talos & POWER9, that architecture is much better than the x86 garbage.But the problem of embedded firmware for the other components on the motherboard remains no matter what the hype from Talos may claim...
OpenPower9 CPUs still may have secret backdoors and/or trojans injected on the factory though missing in open documentation. Without a Libre Silicon tech process it is hard to discover a backdoor, is it correct? I guess the same applies to any CPU designed say by national militarists but with production outsourced for example to South Korea or to any other factory, may be even a factory on their own territory can be hacked to produce backdoored chips.
To have more confidence of lack of backdoors there shall be a method for verification which is available for example when Libre Silicon is used. You know there are so many strange incidents with different aircraft recently.
Are any Libre Silicon CPUs going to be released and supported on some motherboards any soon?
I wouldn't use Linux for anything important, OpenBSD is my preferred choice for serious stuff.
What do you think about LibertyBSD compared to OpenBSD?
The last release they did is 6.1, but there are scripts even for 6.2 and 6.3 in their repository:
https://notabug.org/jadedctrl/libertybsd-scripts-mirror
And what do you think about HardenedBSD compared to OpenBSD?
https://hardenedbsd.org/content/easy-feature-comparison
I love Devuan+Trinity as my desktop and as an application server.
May be running them in VM guests on secured BSD (Open and/or Hardened) hosts will make my Devuan more secure.
I also thought about Illumos as a VM host but did not find any comparison to HBSD hardening features.
What would be the best for a secure ZFS server providing iSCSI blocks for OpenBSD hosts or guests connected via physical Ethernet? I guess it is HBSD?
OpenBSD encrypted FS -> physical Ethernet -> HBSD with ZFS
Is it possible to manually remove firmware blobs from OpenBSD and HBSD without many scripts like in LibertyBSD? Just not installing non-free packages and remove any blob files like firmwares from file system? Shall OpenBSD/HBSD kernel still be recompiled to avoid ALL blobs?
Noticable that all actual security patches are refugees from their original distros. I guess sponsors of mainline kernels actually are not interested in too much outstanding security.
They are more interested in being able to steal user's data exclusively via intelligent services instead of providing protection against this And that is why OpenBSD is a refugee from NetBSD, HBSD from a FreeBSD and Grsecurity from Linux mainline.
What do you think about security of Talos II hardware platform? It looks like a better option than Libreboot (with blobed firmwares yet) ?
https://www.raptorcs.com/content/base/faq.html
May be if more companies realize problems with security of their data on their current server configs they will purchase more Power9 computers and may be pricing will become more fair due to effect of mass production? More used Talos will be available on ebay.
alupoj wrote:How the latest KSPP does compare to Grsecurity 4.9 and latest?
I thought it is a comparison to old KSPP.
If it is a modern KSPP then it looks like loosing to Grsecurity very much?
Do underground groups exist who resell up to date releases of Grsecurity patches for a lower price than original with modern kernels in sources? GPL does not prohibit this.
Does Grsecurity company watermark their patches per each client?
I guess some watermarking can be removed by obfuscating and/or removing fragments not influencing on code understanding like comments, whitespaces, etc.
It seems XEN has/had problems too:
https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-254.html
My password changed again by someone
Btw, if you look at participants of frenode irc channel #ufo
They are also often on channels like #security, #devuan, #conspiracy, #mempo, #freedomeartch, etc.
Don't you need a valid PW to change the PW? Or does this forum have an "I forgot my PW" option? (Too lazy to log out to see if it's there.)
Joke? Is password reset used to find a recipient in recent Echelon data to avoid mining deeper into older layers?
A snapshot of this topic:
https://web.archive.org/web/20190501030 … ?pid=15774
Someone already changed my password during I posted this, I had to reset my password.
OK, I can't really answer all of your questions (nor am I qualified to do so but that doesn't usually stop me) but I can raise some points.
Thank you very much for your suggestions.
There is a hardening-runtime package in beowulf/ceres that adds sysctl & kernel command line options recommended by the kernel self-protection project that should make the system significantly more secure
Please let me know, where can I see a progress and status of KSPP?
How the latest KSPP does compare to Grsecurity 4.9 and latest?
In other distributions, Arch Linux have a linux-hardened kernel version and Parabola GNU/Linux-Libre have a linux-libre-xtreme kernel that also has a "hardened" configuration.
Are these hardened kernels hardened by KSPP?
But don't run an unsupported kernel version, new vulnerabilities are discovered all the time.
There are opinions that a universal patch like Grsecurity prevents more potential new yet unknown security related problems than many up to date fixes to specific already discovered issues.
alupoj wrote:How can I compile ZFS on a libre+grsec kernel?
I don't know but have you got a recent grsec version?
No, just v4.9
And in respect of ZFS, the codebase for that filesystem alone is bigger than the code for the entire OpenBSD base system so the attack surface is *huge* and IMO it is not a good choice for the security-conscious user.
Is ZFS still good for remote backups to another host with ZFS via NFS/FTP/iSCSI, etc. ?
Then what FS shall be used on a secured host? Ext3?
alupoj wrote:is it possible to do the same for ARM Cortex A7/A53? Are these CPUs immune for Spectre?
No, they are not:
https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-s … nerability
I did not find the models I mentioned in your list. These models (A7 and A53) have in order execution without speculative.
And anyway are you not worried about the firmware blobs on components that do not update from the operating system?
Provided hardware does not have flash for keeping last latest update then initial factory firmware can be very old like 10 years old and most likely its backdoors are too obsolete compared to what would be preferred by 3 letter agencies. So IMO it would prevent at least update of backdoors to their modern more advanced variant.
For example, your hard drive controllers are sufficiently complex to pwn your machine: can you say "Stuxnet"?
I guess modern storage like SSD and HDD can have a remote control via radio channel and they can modify data, especially add their own boot loader before loader expected by user. It is in addition to possible attack onto side channel like SATA bus and other buses EMI. It may contain a virtualization trojan in one of unreachable rings of CPU and monitor the whole system RAM and phone to home, may be even by satellite channels, I am not sure how they connect to their management head. May be all internet switches have backdoors to hide some packets or modify them with some hidden data, so that sniffer does not see anything suspicious? Or may be they camouflage in rare DNS queries, I do not know. So the most bad thing about modern storage can be a possibility of remote command to destroy all data. Many other problems can be solved by whole disk encryption for isolation of disk firmware from data on it and ZFS on top of encryption to
constantly verify data consistency.
Storage components are generally the most often upgraded hardware, most desirable by user, having budget even in tough times and therefore can be an attractive place to injects the latest NSA trojan developments even yet on factories.
alupoj wrote:It seems HardenedBSD has a fix for Spectre mitigation.
So do Linux & OpenBSD.
Is an idea of nesting virtual machines with such different hardened kernels (each with mitigation) good for improving whole security of the system and isolation of guests if full emulation like Bochs is used on each level?
Earlier without kernel mitigation it did not help, even high level browser JavaScript in a guest could escape into hypervisor host RAM.
I guess hardware assisted virtualization of guest will not be protected by hardened kernel of host. But what about using slow Bochs emulation on a HardenedBSD kernel which is stated to mitigate Spectre issues?
HardenedBSD -> Bochs full X86 emulator -> Linux with Grsecurity
What CPU shall be used for a fare performance of just general CLI software utilities like PGP, SSH, etc. in the guest?
Is Bochs a completely user space app without own kernel modules?
If it is not available directly for FreeBSD, then may be it can be run in a linux compatibility layer of FreeBSD?
Dear Friends,
Please let me know, what are my options today for a secured kernel?
1) Can I use a relatively old kernel v4.9 with a recent level of userspace like Beowulf testing or even newer?
I guess HEADS linux just does it?
https://heads.dyne.org/
How can I compile ZFS on a libre+grsec kernel?
I was not able to compile ZFS even on libre only kernel (without grsec) and grsec only (without libre = grsec with blobs)
If above will be somehow done, is it possible to do the same for ARM Cortex A7/A53? Are these CPUs immune for Spectre?
2) Is kFreeBSD kernel a customized version for Linux user space?
It cannot be replaced by a general FreeBSD kernel?
I am thinking about HardenedBSD. Shall it be ported specifically as a kFreeBSD kernel to Debian/Devuan?
Will ZFS work?
3) Can I use in Devuan a Linux kernel from another distro like Alpine, Pentoo, Gentoo hardened, etc. ?
4) How can I remove BLOBS from a general non libre kernel?
Since people think firmwares and microcode anyway are already present in devices it is OK to update them. But I do not think so, since BLOBS in distro are more recent modern and up to date, they may contain more advanced modern backdoors which did not exist 10 years ago when some my hardware was produced. So avoiding firmware updates and any other BLOBs can be beneficial in my opinion.
5) It seems HardenedBSD has a fix for Spectre mitigation. Will it work for guests too in ZONEs and /or BHYVE on a HBSD host?
Is following config secure?
HOST: Libreboot -> HardenedBSD -> BHYVE
GUEST: Devuan with a hardened grsecurity kernel v4.9 latest ?
GUEST2: Can I run a nested KVM VM?
Will such Devuan guests be isolated good enough from each other and from host RAM and prevented to read not their RAM areas?
6) Is HardenedBSD much more secure than an Illumos based os like a SmartOS?
7) Do old Intel CPUs like Core 2 Quad Q9500 Yorkfield have flash memory for microcode?
So once booted into a Live CD like SystemRescueCD they are flashed with a modern microcode and power off does not reset this?
Is it possible to revert microcode version to initial level?
What do you think about how secure is MIPS hardware of a router like WNDR3800 with 128Mb RAM?
This router can boot into fully free open source LibreCMC.
It can be managed from text terminal via SSH or serial console.
Can I add SWAP on LibreCMC located on a USB flash by swapon command?
Can I then chroot from LibreCMC into another distro like Debian v8/v9 located on a USB flash drive?
Only text mode is needed, NO graphical desktop is needed.
So I think I have to make a custom Laptop based on a CortexA7 AllWinner board compatible with OpenBSD.
You can see an example of such DIY:
https://web.archive.org/web/20190209180 … aptop.html
They use a special adapter to convert a general Thinkpad Keyboard to USB channel.
I think such adapter can be found in different Android ARM based smartbooks (not sure about Windows Atom smartbooks). Does anyone know which smartbook have a USB keyboard which could be reused in a custom made Laptop?
Please note a few features of a laptop/tablet I am looking for:
1) Spectre free CPU with "in order" execution and not very modern to avoid backdoors like Cortex A7.
2) Open source drivers in a Linux mainline like for AllWinner A20 realization.
3) Able to boot into FreeBSD/OpenBSD
4) May be it can be a custom made laptop from Olimex Olinuxino A20 like this:
https://wot.lv/my-take-on-a-custom-laptop.html
5) USB port able to connect to USB hub with several devices like external USB keyboard, mouse, HDD, etc.
6) BLOB free boot to avoid hardware trojans managing ARM worlds in TrusZone
Please suggest a netbook (tablet with a keyboard)
Cortex A7 preferably AllWinner A20/A23/A31/A33
Thank you very much for your help!
Raspberry seems requires a BLOB to boot which is bad from security point of view.
I need a hardware 100% free of active BLOBs which are missing public source code.
Someone thinks that Allwinner, STM32, LPC and OMAP can boot 100% free of BLOBs, is it correct?
It should boot into Linux or BSD WITHOUT any single BLOB
and following ports should work: USB, SATA, Ethernet, any display
PCI port if present would be desirable too
I do NOT need multimedia like sound, 3D video, etc.
It is a security console for remote administration of servers via SSH and VNC.
Only for work, not for games.
Does an ability of a guest to escape into the host address space depend on a type of virtualization?
For example slow full emulation like in Bochs (when original CPU instructions are converted to other instructions before execution) vs fast hardware virtualization (when CPU instructions are executed almost unchanged just in another context) if I understand correctly ?
What about a full emulation of even another architecture? Say fully emulating immune Cortex A53 virtual hardware on a X86 hardware which is not immune to spectre by itself?
Is it so easy to produce a code for a Cortex A53 virtual guest CPU which would be translated into vulnerable hardware X86 host instructions?
Can bochs full emulation prevent escaping from guest to host using spectre like vulnerabilities?